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Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) systems are essential to the safe operations of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems, and have the objectives of mitigating collisions with and remaining Well Clear of 
manned aircraft. This paper analyzes four candidate DAA Well Clear definitions for non-
cooperative aircraft using mitigated performance metrics of DAA systems. These DAA Well 
Clear definitions were proposed in previous work based on their unmitigated collision risk 
and maneuver initiation range. In this work they are evaluated using safety and operational 
suitability metrics computed from a large number of representative encounters. Results 
suggest that although the four candidate DAA Well Clear definitions provide comparable 
safety, the alerting characteristics give preference for the DAA Well Clear definition without 
a temporal parameter. 
I. Introduction 
Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems are essential for safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System 
(NAS). DAA Systems provide surveillance, alerts, and guidance to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to help them 
remain Well Clear of other aircraft. DAA Well Clear (DWC) is a separation standard used in DAA systems that is 
designed as an alternative means of compliance with see-and-avoid regulations to support safe operations and avoid 
collisions between unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft. Previously, a process based on safety performance and 
operational suitability [1] [2] was followed to select and fine-tune DWC standards for UAS operations in non-terminal 
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areas. These standards are documented in the Phase 1 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for 
DAA systems [3] and air-to-air radar [4] published by the RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) in 2017, as well 
as the corresponding Technical Standard Orders (TSO), TSO-C211 and TSO-C212 published by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) in October 2017. The UAS in the Phase 1 MOPS are assumed to be equipped with Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In, airborne active surveillance, and a high-power air-to-air radar that 
can detect aircraft without transponders (non-cooperative aircraft). Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) II Resolution Advisories (RAs) are optional. The Phase 1 UAS  can operate atairspeeds up to 200 kts. Phase 
2 work for extending the MOPS to additional UAS categories and operations is underway.  
One of the main objectives of the Phase 2 development is to define an alternative DAA Well Clear (DWC) 
definition for UAS encountering non-cooperative aircraft. The DWC in the Phase 1 work was selected with 
considerations of interoperability with TCAS-II. To avoid triggering TCAS resolution advisories during an encounter 
(leading to DAA maneuvers), the DWC was defined to encompass a vast majority of the TCAS alerting volume. The 
resulting DWC is deemed very safe but may be unnecessarily large for encounters of UAS with non-cooperative 
aircraft, because TCAS-II cannot detect non-cooperative aircraft and hence, noncooperative aircraft will not trigger 
TCAS RAs. Four DWC candidates were proposed for additional evaluation based on a previous study performed by 
NASA, Lincoln Laboratory, and Adaptive Aerospace [5]. These four candidate DWC were proposed based on 
considerations of the unmitigated collision rate, maneuver initiation range, and other factors. 
Another objective of the Phase 2 DAA MOPS is to define requirements for operations of UAS equipped with low 
cost, size, weight, and performance (C-SWaP) sensors, or low C-SWaP UAS. Many UAS are too small or budget-
constrained to carry the large, high-power radar required by the Phase 1 MOPS. Examples are the Aerosonde and 
Shadow UAS. Low C-SWaP sensors tend to have shorter detection. However, the limited detection range of low C-
SWaP sensors may be acceptable when considering the reduced closing speed of encounters given the reduced low 
C-SWaP UAS speeds. Reconsidering the DAA Well Clear definition in the context of non-cooperative aircraft may 
help preserve the alerting timeline in the presence of limited surveillance range.  
The DWC definition considered in this work is for UAS against non-cooperative aircraft. It is anticipated to be 
applicable to both Phase 1 UAS and low C-SWaP UAS. A reduced DWC can potentially reduce the required radar 
surveillance volume for Phase 1 UAS. However, a potential downside of a reduced DWC is a reduction in the DAA 
systems’ overall safety. 
This paper presents an evaluation of four candidate DAA Well Clear (DWC) definitions [5] using encounters 
representative of both a low-C-SWaP and a Phase 1 UAS encountering a non-cooperative aircraft. The focus of this 
analysis is to assess the safety and operational suitability metrics achieved using these candidate DWC definitions. 
These metrics provide an indication of whether the system will be able to remain Well Clear of other aircraft without 
alerting or maneuvering unnecessarily, which could interfere with the operations of the UAS, other aircraft, or air 
traffic control (ATC). Section II reviews the approach used to evaluate the DWC candidates, including the encounter 
sets and pilot response model that was used. Results are presented in Section III, and conclusions and future work are 
discussed in Section IV. 
II. Approach 
The DWC candidates are shown in Table 1. DWC1 and DWC2 are the two primary candidates, both achieving a 
desirable unmitigated collision risk of 5%. Unmitigated collision risk is the likelihood that two aircraft would violate 
the DAA Well Clear definition if neither aircraft used a DAA system. DWC1 achieves the minimum maneuver initial 
range (MIR), which is the range between aircraft when the UAS must start maneuvering away in order to maintain 
DWC, whereas DWC2 is simple because it does not have a time component. DWC3 and DWC4 are backup candidates 
carried forward from previous analysis in case DWC1 and DWC2 do not perform well in certain categories of metrics. 
DWC3 achieves a “risky” unmitigated collision risk of 7%. It was once proposed for terminal area UAS operations. 
DWC4 achieves an unmitigated collision risk between 3.5-4% and was considered a “safer” candidate that achieves 
an unmitigated collision risk of less than 5%. In addition to the four DWC candidates selected in [5], the Phase 1 DWC 
definition was also evaluated for comparison.  
Table 1 DWC Candidates 
 
DWC1 DWC2 DWC3 DWC4 Phase 1 
HMD* 2000 ft 2200 ft 1500 ft 2500 ft 4000 ft 
h* 450 ft 450 ft 450 ft 450 ft 450 ft 
𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* 15 s 0 s 15 s 25 s 35 s 
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The DWC candidates are defined by thresholds of three parameters: horizontal miss distance (HMD), vertical 
separation threshold (h), and 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑 . HMD*, h*, and 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* are the specific values of these parameters used to define 
each DWC candidate. The HMD parameter is the predicted minimum horizontal distance during an encounter, 
assuming constant velocities and straight line flight. The h parameter is the current altitude difference between the 
two aircraft. For all candidates, h* is 450 ft, which is equal to the component used in the Phase 1 MOPS. The definition 
of 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑  is  
 
𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑 =  {
−
𝑟2 − 𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑑
2
𝑟?̇?
, 𝑟 > 𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑑 ,
0, 𝑟 ≤ 𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑑
(1) 
 
where 𝑟 and ?̇? are horizontal range and range rate, respectively, between the UAS and the intruder. 𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑑  is the 
distance modification and defines the radius of a cylinder around the UAS. In this analysis, 𝐷𝑚𝑜𝑑 is set equal to the 
horizontal miss distance threshold, HMD *, in the DWC definitions. A loss of DWC (LoDWC) occurs when all three 
parameters, computed from aircraft states, fall below their respective thresholds.  
One million uncorrelated encounters between one low-C-SWaP UAS and one non-cooperative intruder, and one 
million uncorrelated encounters between one Phase 1 UAS and one non-cooperative intruder were simulated. 
Uncorrelated encounters are situations where intervention from ATC is unlikely, such that aircraft blunder into close 
proximity. The UAS trajectory is sampled from NASA’s Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES) UAS database 
[6], and the intruder trajectory is sampled from Lincoln Laboratory’s Uncorrelated Encounter Model [7].  
Next, the encounters are simulated using the Detect and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems 
(DAIDALUS) as the DAA alerting and guidance algorithm [8]. DAIDALUS is a reference algorithm used to validate 
the Phase 1 MOPS, and was used in this study as a representative DAA algorithm. DAIDALUS generates maneuver 
guidance by projecting candidate vertical and horizontal DAA maneuvers to determine which would result in conflicts, 
and which can be used to aid the pilot in resolving the situation manually. The evaluation for each DWC consisted of 
two scenarios: one nominal (or unmitigated) and one mitigated. 
DAIDALUS issues three types of alerts in increasing levels of severity: preventive, corrective, and warning. The 
lowest level, preventive, is primarily used to alert the pilot to not maneuver vertically when the aircraft are separated 
vertically by 450-700 feet. The second level, corrective, indicates that a LoDWC is predicted and an avoidance 
maneuver is necessary, but there is still time for coordination with ATC. The highest level, warning, indicates that a 
LoDWC is imminent, an immediate avoidance maneuver is needed, and coordination with ATC before maneuvering 
is not a requirement. Upon alerting, DAIDALUS generates corresponding preventive, corrective, and warning 
guidance indicating a range of conflict-free headings and altitudes for a pilot to select from in order to maintain DWC 
separation. In the event that a LoDWC cannot be avoided, DAIDALUS also generates regain DWC guidance, a range 
of heading or altitude that can be executed to increase separation at CPA and regain DWC effectively. 
DAIDALUS alerts are issued based on a buffered DWC volume. Specifically, the HMD* used by the DAA alerting 
and guidance algorithm is scaled by a factor of 1.52 to be consistent with the parameters referenced in the Phase 1 
MOPS [3]. This buffer is meant to guard against maneuvering intruders and surveillance uncertainties (there are none 
in this work). In the simulation, the ownship only maneuvers when a corrective or warning alert is received. For 
maneuver guidance computation, the low C-SWaP UAS turn rate was assumed to be 7 deg/sec, which is suitable for 
UAS speeds from 40 to 100 kts and results in approximately the same bank angle and load factor as the Phase 1 UAS 
turn rate, which was assumed to be 3 deg/sec. 
The simulations of low C-SWaP UAS were performed using perfect (truth) surveillance, i.e., with no track 
uncertainty or range limitations, in order to evaluate the mitigated performance of low C-SWaP without confounding 
factors (such as limited surveillance range or sensor noise). However, to assess the potential impacts of limited 
detection ranges on safety, simulations were also run with 2 NM, 3 NM, and 4 NM surveillance ranges applied; the 
results of these simulations are presented in Section III. The simulations of Phase 1 UAS were run with truth 
surveillance (i.e., no track uncertainty) constrained by a Phase 1 radar field, defined as ±8 NM range, ±15° elevation, 
and ±110° azimuth. The reason for using the Phase 1 radar surveillance volume is to faciliate comparison to a previous 
study of the Phase 1 UAS [9]. Upon completion of the simulations, metrics are computed to compare the performance 
of the DWC definitions.  
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A. Metrics 
The safety and operational suitability metrics provide an indication of whether the system will be able to operate 
safely without interfering with the operations of other aircraft and without causing DAIDALUS to alert unnecessarily. 
These metrics and their formulation are shown in Table 2 and  
Table 3. 
Table 2 Safety Metrics 
Metric Notes 
NMAC Risk Ratio 𝑃(𝑁𝑀𝐴𝐶|𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝑃(𝑁𝑀𝐴𝐶|𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
 
 
A Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) occurs when the separation between two aircraft 
is less than 500 ft horizontally and 100 ft vertically [10]. If the ratio is less than one, 
then the mitigated system reduces the risk of NMAC. For example, a risk ratio of 0.1 
indicates a 90% reduction in risk. Small values are desirable. 
LoDWC Ratio 𝑃(𝐿𝑜𝐷𝑊𝐶|𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝑃(𝐿𝑜𝐷𝑊𝐶|𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
 
 
Similar to the NMAC risk ratio, if the LoDWC risk ratio is less than one, then the 
mitigated system reduces the risk of LoDWC. Small values are desirable. 
 
Table 3 Operational Suitability Metrics 
Metric Notes 
Alert Ratio 𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑡|𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
𝑃(𝑁𝑀𝐴𝐶|𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
 
 
Given the same risk ratio, systems with lower alert ratios are desirable, since fewer 
alerts indicate fewer unnecessary maneuvers.  
Alerting time and range 
relative to the LoDWC 
point 
This metric can help inform alerting timeline requirements, and thus, sensor range 
requirements.  
 
B. Encounters 
This study assessed two sets of encounters: one set with encounters between one low C-SWaP UAS and one non-
cooperative intruder, and the other set with encounters between one Phase 1 UAS and one non-cooperative intruder. 
All encounters contains 1 Hz aircraft states, and a majority of encounters last 180 seconds.These encounters were 
generated by pairing one projected UAS trajectory generated by NASA’s UAS mission flights, and one intruder 
trajectory sampled from MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s Uncorrelated Encounter Model [7]. NASA’s UAS mission flights 
consist of 19 different types of missions, including aerial imaging and mapping, law enforcement, and air quality 
monitoring. The demand and mission profiles were generated based on subject matter experts’ opinions and socio-
economic analysis [11]. The trajectories cover the entire continental US.  These aircraft models are defined in a way 
similar to those in the Eurocontrol Base of Aircraft Data (BADA) [12]. In the low C-SWaP encounter set, two types 
of UAS were considered: the RA-7 AAI Shadow B and the MQ-19 AAI Aerosonde. The Phase 1 encounter set 
includes trajectories for seven types of UAS: Cessna 208 Caravan, Cessna 510 Citation Mustang, AAI Aerosonde, 
MQ-9A Reaper, RQ-4A Global Hawk, Shadow B, and Socata Trinidad. 
The Uncorrelated Encounter Model is derived from radar data of observed aircraft operations under visual flight 
rules (VFR) in the National Airspace System. The model is sampled to produce random aircraft trajectories that are 
statistically representative of non-cooperative trajectories. Each encounter is specified by the initial positions and 
orientations of the two aircraft in the simulation and the nominal dynamic maneuvers that may occur leading up to the 
time of closest approach (TCA).  
Filters were applied to the ownship and intruder speeds and altitudes to ensure that the dynamics of the sampled 
trajectories are within the bounds for low C-SWaP UAS or Phase 1 UAS, and the intruders they are expected to 
encounter. The intruder characteristics from the Uncorrelated Encounter Model are the same in both sets of encounters. 
The low C-SWaP UAS speeds are constrained to be between 40 and 100 kts, and the Phase 1 UAS speeds are 
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constrained to be between 40 and 250 kts, 50 kts more than permitted by the Phase 1 MOPS so as to explore potential 
safety issues for faster UASs. The intruder speeds range from 0 to 170 kts, the 95 percentile speed for non-cooperative 
intruders in the Uncorrelated Encounter Model [7]. Intruders with zero speed represent aircraft like helicopters that 
are hovering. The encounters occur at altitudes between 500 ft above ground level (AGL) and 10,999 ft mean sea level 
(MSL), in airspace classes E and G. Although Class E only goes up to 10,000 ft when it is adjacent to class B or class 
C airspace, altitudes up to 10,999 feet were included to represent a few UAS missions that are flown slightly above 
10,000 ft. The resulting altitude and speed distributions are shown in  Ownship Type 
Fig. 1 and          a) Altitudes              b) Speeds         c) Ownship Type 
Fig. 2.  
      
         a) Altitudes              b) Speeds         c) Ownship Type 
Fig. 1 Low C-SWaP UAS Encounter Characteristics 
 
         a) Altitudes              b) Speeds         c) Ownship Type 
Fig. 2 Phase 1 UAS Encounter Characteristics 
 
C. Pilot Response Model  
Upon alerting, DAIDALUS provides guidance indicating a range of conflict-free headings and altitudes. The SC-
228 standard pilot model created by Lincoln Laboratory [13] is then used to select and execute an appropriate 
maneuver. Encounters with an alert within the first 5 seconds of the encounter are excluded from the analysis to ensure 
that the pilot response model is given adequate time to resolve the conflict. Only horizontal maneuvers were executed 
because vertical maneuvers against non-cooperative intruders are much less robust in most situations due to the 
uncertainties in non-cooperative sensors’ vertical measurements. The pilot response model was executed in 
deterministic mode, meaning that the ownship always maneuvers horizontally in the direction of the minimum 
suggested maneuver. In the event that the minimum suggestion is inconclusive, the ownship will turn left, as a 
preference for left turns was observed in human-in-the-loop experiments [13]. For this analysis, the pilot model 
chooses the minimum heading change suggested by the guidance bands. Although variability was observed in human-
in-the loop experiments, the minimum heading change was used in the analysis to isolate the effect of the DAA Well 
Clear definition from other parameters. 
After the first alert is received, the pilot response model has a 5 sec initial delay representing the time it takes the 
pilot to perceive the alert and devise a plan. For corrective alerts, there is an 11 sec ATC coordination time representing 
the time it takes the pilot to communicate the intended maneuver with ATC and receive approval. The ATC 
coordination time is then followed by a 3 sec execution delay representing the time it takes the pilot to enter the 
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maneuver command into the control station and transmit this command to the UAS. The ownship may perform 
multiple maneuvers per encounter to resolve a conflict. The time between pilot response model decisions is determined 
by the alert state, as shown in  
 
Table 4. For example, if the pilot model chooses a maneuver during a warning alert state, then the situation will 
be reevaluated after 9 seconds (the decision update period), and a different subsequent maneuver can be issued at that 
time, if needed. All delays and times (e.g., the 11 sec ATC coordination time, 3 sec execution delay, etc.) are the mean 
values of distributions observed from human-in-the loop studies used to build the pilot response model [13].  
 
Table 4 Pilot Response Model Decision Update Times 
Alert Condition Decision Update Period (s) 
No Alert 24 
Preventive Alert 15 
Corrective Alert 9 
Warning Alert 9 
Regain DAA Well Clear Guidance 3 
III. Results 
This section presents the metrics that were evaluated. Although HMD* and 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* are not completely independent 
(because the definition of 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* is dependent on HMD*), this study may be able to provide some insight into the 
effect of HMD* and 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* on the metrics. Because DWC1 and DWC3 have the same 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* but different HMD*s, 
HMD* likely causes any difference in metrics between DWC1 and DWC3. Likewise, because DWC1 and DWC2 
have similar HMD* but different 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑*, 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* likely causes any difference in metrics between DWC1 and DWC2. 
Results for low C-SWaP UAS will be presented first (Section A), and results for Phase 1 UAS will be presented in 
the following subsection (Section B). All results are for mitigated encounters, unless otherwise specified. 
 
A. Low C-SWaP UAS Results 
A.1 Safety Metrics 
Fig. 3 shows the NMAC risk ratios (left) and LoDWC ratios (right) for the four DWC candidates. The causes of 
NMACs after DAA maneuvers include the following: 
1. Intruder and ownship maneuvers 
2. Surveillance volume limitation and sensor uncertainties (none in this simulation) 
3. Guidance ineffectiveness or instability of guidance 
4. Pilot response unable to keep up with the situation 
For any specific encounter leading to an NMAC, all causes could have contributed to it. For example, analysis of a 
few select encounters leading to NMACs indicates an intruder maneuver near the UAS, causing the conflict guidance 
bands to saturate, leaving no conflict-free heading available. In this situation, the WCR guidance comes up, is 
executed, but changes turn directions multiple times during the UAS’s maneuver. Combined with the pilot response 
delay, this instability of guidance can cause a chase situation, resulting in the DAA system’s failure to avoid an 
NMAC. The LoDWCs result from similar causes. 
Fig. 5 puts NMACs into two categories. Unresolved NMAC risk is comprised of encounters that lead to nominal 
NMACs (i.e., without a DAA system) and which still have NMACs with the DAA system. Induced NMAC is 
comprised of encounters that do not have nominal NMACs but develop into NMACs with the DAA maneuver in 
response to DAA guidance. The unresolved and induced LoDWCs are defined in a similar way. 
An important observation of the NMAC risk ratios shown in Fig. 3 is that they are all fairly small and there is no 
statistically significant difference among them, even when compared to the Phase 1 DWC, This suggests that, given 
sufficient surveillance volume (infinite for this simulation) and small surveillance uncertainties (none for this 
simulation), all candidate DWCs are likely to be acceptable in terms of their resulting DAA performance to avoid 
NMACs. Interestingly, the Phase 1 DWC does not perform better with its large volume. In reality, finite surveillance 
volume and sensor uncertainties will increase the NMAC risk ratios.  
In terms of LoDWC ratio, DAA is unable to avoid LoDWC in about 10% of the encounters. DWC2 has the lowest 
value of .09 but is only marginally lower than DWC1’s .10. DWC3, DWC4, and the Phase 1 DWC all have comparable 
values (0.12). Unresolved risk ratios comprise  the majority of the LoDWC counts. Intruder and ownship maneuvers 
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are likely to be the main cause of these unresolved LoDWCs. Adding a buffer to the heading selected by the pilot 
response model was tested in this study, but showed no improvement.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Safety Ratios 
 One of the trends observed among the encounters with NMACs was that the intruder or ownship had a nominal 
(scheduled) maneuver late during the encounter. Nominal maneuvers are maneuvers that are part of the original 
unmitigated encounter. To analyze the impact of this trend, NMAC risk ratios and LoDWC ratios were computed for 
the subset of encounters where neither the ownship nor intruder has a nominal maneuver within 30 seconds of nominal 
TCA (Fig. 4), and for the subset of encounters with late maneuvers—i.e., where either the ownship or intruder has a 
nominal maneuver within 30 seconds of nominal TCA (Fig. 5). Compared to the safety ratios for all encounters (Fig. 
3), the safety ratios without maneuvering (Fig. 4) are much lower.  Phase 1 now has the highest LoDWC ratio, whereas 
previously, the LoDWC ratios for all encounters were comparable among DWC3, DWC4, and Phase 1. Since the 
Phase 1 DWC is the largest and has the longest timeline, it is likely that maneuvers that occurred 30 seconds or more 
before the TCA contribute a sizable number to the LoDWC risk. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Safety Ratios without Ownship or Intruder Maneuvering 
 In contrast, the NMAC risk ratios and LoDWC ratios with late maneuvers (Fig. 5) are much higher compared to 
ratios where encounters with maneuvers are excluded. This suggests that one reason the risk ratios for all encounters 
are comparable is because the risk comes primarily from encounters with late maneuvers (and hence, late alerts), 
which cannot be mitigated by any DWC. DWC3 is the least robust to late maneuvers with the highest LoDWC ratio, 
the second-highest NMAC risk ratio, and the most unresolved NMACs. 
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Fig. 5 Safety Ratios with Ownship or Intruder Late Maneuvering 
The system operating characteristic (Fig. 6) allows simultaneous evaluation of safety and operational suitability. 
The alert ratio measures the alert frequency relative to the unmitigated NMAC frequency, so it is independent of the 
encounter definition. Ideally, low values of both metrics are preferred and therefore the closer a system is to the origin 
the better. HMD* appears to have the largest effect on alert ratio; DWC1 and DWC3 have the same 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑*, but DWC1 
has a larger HMD* and alerts more frequently. DWC3 has the lowest alert ratio because it has the smallest HMD*. 
 
Fig. 6 System Operating Characteristic for Low C-SWaP Encounters 
A.2. Operational Suitability Metrics 
 Alerting time and range are computed based on the first alert of any level that occurs in an encounter. Alerting 
time is the projected time to unmitigated LoDWC when the alert occurs. Only encounters that have an unmitigated 
LoDWC are included in this metric. Fig. 7 shows the cumulative distribution function for alerting time and range. The 
cumulative distribution function is the probability that alerting time or range will be less than or equal to the values 
on the x-axis. For example, the alerting range plot shows that 60% of encounters run with DWC4 alert at range of 3 
NM or less, and all encounters run with DWC4 alert within 6 NM.  
Mitigated encounters that, with DAA maneuvers, still result in a LoDWC (dashed lines) have on average later alert 
times and shorter ranges than all encounters with an alert (solid lines). This suggests that many LoDWCs may be 
caused by late nominal (non-DAA) maneuvers. Alerting time and range are driven more by 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑  than by HMD (as 
indicated by the larger difference between DWC1 and DWC2 than between DWC1 and DWC3). DWC2, which has 
no 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑 , has the earliest alerting time relative to LoDWC and the smallest alerting range. This implies the surveillance 
range required to provide the alerting timeline for DWC2 is likely smaller than those for other DWCs. 
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Fig. 7 Alerting Time and Range. Solid lines are all encounters. Dashed lines are encounters with LoDWC. 
 
A.3. Effect of Surveillance Range on Safety Metrics 
To assess the potential impact of limited surveillance ranges on safety, NMAC risk ratios and LoDWC ratios were 
compared for simulations run with a 2 NM, 3 NM, and 4 NM surveillance range limit (shown in Fig. 8). The NMAC 
risk ratios for DWC 1, 2, and 3 are largely insensitive to reduced surveillance ranges. On the other hand, the NMAC 
risk ratios for DWC4 and Phase 1 experience large increases when the surveillance range is reduced to 2 NM. For the 
DWC4 and Phase 1 volumes, the intruder is sometimes not observed until loss of Well Clear has already occurred 
(particularly during higher speed encounters), and DAIDALUS’s regain DWC guidance is likely not as effective in 
avoiding NMACs as its maintain DWC guidance. The LoDWC risk ratios for DWC1 and DWC2 increase noticeably 
while the value for DWC3 stays constant at 2 NM. The LoDWC risk ratios for DWC4 and the Phase DWC increase 
the most because 2 NM is inside of their DWC volume for some encounters. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Safety Ratios for Limited Surveillance Ranges 
 
B. Phase I UAS Results 
Analysis of the Phase 1 UAS encounters was performed on a set of one million encounters between one Phase 1 
UAS and one non-cooperative intruder. The same DWC volumes used to evaluate the low C-SWaP UAS encounters 
were used to evaluate the Phase 1 UAS encounters in order to understand the effect of high speed UAS and baseline 
any additional differences when comparing to Phase 1 results. For the Phase 1 UAS results, truth surveillance data 
were constrained by the Phase 1 radar field of view, defined as ±8 NM range, ±15° elevation, and ±110° azimuth. 
 
 
 10 
 
B.1. Safety Metrics 
Fig. 9 shows the NMAC risk ratios (left) and LoDWC ratios (right). Results similar to those for low C-SWaP UAS 
are desirable because this would corroborate the notion that the same DWC can be applied to both low C-SWaP UAS 
and Phase 1 UAS. As with the low C-SWaP UAS results, the NMAC risk ratios and LoDWC ratios are comparable 
among the DWC candidates. However, the risk ratios are approximately five times larger than the risk ratios for low 
C-SWaP UAS, and the LoDWC ratios are approximately two times larger than the LoDWC ratios for low C-SWaP 
UAS. This difference is primarily due to the limited 110° bearing range, which results in undetected intruders and 
therefore unresolved NMACs and LoDWCs. When the Phase 1 risk ratios and LoDWC ratios are computed without 
bearing and elevation limitations (as shown in Fig. 10), the results are much closer to the ratios obtained using the low 
C-SWaP encounter set (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 9 Safety Ratios 
 
Fig. 10  Safety Ratios with Full Field of View 
Fig. 11 compares the above safety metrics to the alert ratio, providing insight into the potential tradeoff between 
safety and operational suitability. Like the low C-SWaP encounter set (Fig. 6), HMD has the largest effect on alert 
ratio; larger volumes result in significantly higher alert ratios, while maintaining similar safety. 
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Fig. 11 System Operating Characteristic for Phase 1 Encounters 
B.2 Operational Suitability Metrics 
Fig. 12 illustrates the time of alert, prior to unmitigated LoDWC (left) and range at time of first alert (right). The 
time of alerts has a noticeable negative portion (the non-zero cumulative frequency at 0 alert time) because many 
intruders enter the DWC volume undetected by the limited surveillance volume. As expected, the larger Phase 1 
volume alerts sooner and at larger separations. Similar trends are seen compared to the low C-SWaP UAS analysis 
(Fig. 7); again, alerting time and range are driven more by 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑  than HMD. DWC2, which has no 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑 , has the 
earliest alerting time relative to LoDWC and the smallest alerting range.  
 
 
 
Fig. 12 Alerting Time and Range. Solid lines are all encounters. Dashed lines are encounters with LoDWC. 
 
B.3 Effect of Ownship Speed on Safety 
The Phase 1 UAS encounters encompass both low C-SWaP and high-performance aircraft against a VFR intruder. 
To assess the sensitivity of the safety metrics to ownship speed, the results were binned by maximum ownship speed 
shown in Table 5. The relative frequency of encounters in each of these bins is shown in Fig. 13. 
Table 5 – Ownship Speed Bins 
Bin Maximum Ownship Speed Range 
1 40 – 100 knots 
2 100 – 150 knots 
3 150 – 200 knots 
4 200+ knots 
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Fig. 13  Frequency of Encounters per Bin 
Fig. 14 shows the risk ratios binned by maximum ownship speed. There are no mitigated NMACs when the 
ownship aircraft has a maximum speed greater than 200 knots (Speed Bin 4), but this could be caused by the few 
number of encounters in Speed Bin 4. Likewise, DWC3 appears to induce NMACs for Speed Bin 3, but this is not 
statistically significant. In general, the risk ratios in Speed Bin 1 are highest, mainly because UAS in Speed Bin 1 are 
more likely to have overtaking aircraft from the rear, outside the radar’s field of view. UAS in speed bins 2, 3, and 4 
usually fly faster than the intruder and are therefore less likely to have undetected intruders approach from the rear.  
 
 
Fig. 14 NMAC Risk Ratios Binned by Speed 
Fig. 15 shows the LoDWC ratios binned by maximum ownship speed. For slower aircraft (Speed Bin 1), LoDWC 
ratios are all comparable. For faster aircraft (Speed Bins 2, 3, 4), 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* seems to have a larger effect (low 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* leads 
to lower LoDWC ratios). DWC2, the only DWC with a zero 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑*, consistently leads to the lowest LoDWC risk 
ratio.  
Although not modeled in this work, sensor uncertainties are likely to increase the NMAC and LoDWC risk ratio. 
For example, a MITRE study [9] yielded a NMAC risk ratio of 0.22 for a class of UAS similar to those in the Speed 
Bin 1 when taking into account sensor uncertainties (compared to 0.15 without uncertainty in this simulation), and a 
LoDWC risk ratio of 0.42 for a class of UAS similar to those in the Speed Bin 1 when taking into account sensor 
uncertainties (compared to 0.28 without uncertainty in this simulation). 
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Fig. 15  LoDWC Ratios Binned by Speed 
IV. Conclusion and Future Work 
This analysis evaluated four potential Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) Well Clear (DWC) definitions for UAS 
encountering non-cooperative aircraft using safety and operational suitability metrics. Two sets of encounters were 
used to evaluate the metrics in the two operational contexts of interest: one with encounters between low C-SWaP 
UAS and non-cooperative intruders, and another with encounters between Phase 1 UAS and non-cooperative 
intruders. 
The low C-SWaP UAS analysis shows that NMAC risk and LoDWC ratios are not sensitive to DWC parameters 
under perfect surveillance. Furthermore, safety and operational suitability are not dependent on 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑*; this indicates 
that 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* may not be necessary in a DWC definition.  𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* affects mainly alerting performance (timing and range), 
whereas safety and operational suitability are of primary concern for a DAA Well Clear definition for low C-SWaP 
UAS. Because 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑  requires a larger tracking range without providing any additional safety or operational suitability 
benefit, the results give preference to DWC2, which has no temporal parameter.  
The Phase 1 UAS analysis results generally follow the same trends as the low C-SWaP UAS analysis results. In 
terms of safety, with no radar field of view applied, the risk ratio and LoDWC ratios for Phase 1 UAS are comparable 
to those for low C-SWaP UAS. This seems to support the hypothesis that the final non-cooperative DWC definition 
for low C-SWaP UAS is also applicable to Phase 1 UAS. With the Phase 1 radar field of view applied, NMAC and 
LoDWC risk ratios increase noticeably due to a large number of undetected intruders approaching from the rear of the 
UAS. 
The Phase 1 UAS analysis results were also binned by maximum ownship speed. As ownship speed increases, the 
LoDWC risk ratios seem to be driven more by 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* than by HMD*. A smaller 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑* seems to have little effect on 
safety at low speeds and also reduces the safety ratios at high speeds. This again corroborates the result that 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑  is 
not needed in a definition for low C-SWaP UAS and Phase 1 UAS against non-cooperative intruders.  
Based on the findings presented in this paper as well as a companion paper [15], SC-228 has selected DWC2 (2200 
ft, 450 ft, 0 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑*) for low C-SWaP UAS and Phase 1 UAS encountering non-cooperative aircraft. 
 The following tasks can be considered as follow-on efforts to this analysis: 
• Additional safety analyses using DWC2, and potentially test lower HMD values with 0 𝜏𝑚𝑜𝑑  to see if the 
DAA Well Clear definition can be further reduced 
• Access the effects of intruder speed or relative speed on safety performance  
• Development and validation of low C-SWaP sensor requirements, and associated guidance and alerting 
• Human factors evaluation of low C-SWaP DWC to validate the alerting timeline, and understand ATC 
response to and pilot acceptability of the low C-SWaP DWC. 
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